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 1. Introduction 
When most people hear the word 'safety' they think of situations where something 
has gone wrong. It can be smaller events from their own experience, or major 
accidents they have read about in the news. 'Safety' makes us think about incidents
and accidents - about (low probability) events with adverse outcomes, which is why
safety traditionally is defined as a condition where nothing goes wrong as illustrated
by the following typical definitions: 
 
• Safety is the freedom from unacceptable risk (The American National Standards 
Institute). 
• Safety is the freedom from accidental injury (U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality). 
• Safety is the state in which harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, 
and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of 
hazard identification and risk management (International Civil Aviation Organization). 
 
The reason for this understanding of safety is not hard to find. It makes good practical
sense to pay attention to situations where something has gone or may go wrong, 
both because such situations by definition are unexpected and because they may 
lead to harm or injury - the loss of life, materials, or money. It is therefore a natural 
response to try to find out why something went wrong so that steps can be taken 
to prevent it from happening again. 
1.1 The causality credo 
Explanations of how accidents happen usually refer to a set of assumption about how
causes lead to effects, often expressed as an accident model. The simplest accident 
model is the Domino model (Heinrich, 1931), which relies on simple linear causality 
using the analogy of a set of domino pieces that fall one after the other. According 
to the logic of simple linear causality, the purpose of event analysis is to reason 
backwards from the injury to find the 'root cause'. Similarly, the purpose of risk analysis
is to look for whether a specific component may fail or malfunction, either by itself 
or in combination with another failure or malfunction, and thereby become the first
domino piece to fall. 
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Simple linear models were in the 1980s complemented by composite linear models, of which the best known example is the Swiss 
cheese model (Reason, 1997). These models explain adverse outcomes as combinations of active failures (or unsafe acts) and 
latent conditions (hazards conceived as degraded barriers or weakened defences). An event analysis thus looks for how degraded 
barriers or defences interacted with active (human) failures. Similarly, risk analysis looks for conditions where combinations of 
single failures and latent conditions may result in an adverse outcome. 
 
Common to all accident models is the unspoken assumption that outcomes can be understood as effects that follow from prior 
causes. Since that corresponds to a belief in the laws of causality, it may be called a causality credo. This can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
• Adverse outcomes happen because something has gone wrong. Adverse outcomes have causes. There is also a valence or value 
congruence between causes and outcomes, so that bad outcomes have bad causes and vice versa. 
• It is possible to find these causes provided enough evidence is collected. Once the causes have been found, they can be 
eliminated, encapsulated, or otherwise neutralised. 
• Since all adverse outcomes have causes, and since all causes can be found, it follows that all accidents can be prevented. This 
is the vision of zero accidents or zero harm that many companies find attractive. 
 
The causes that we look for, and therefore also the causes we find, necessarily corresponds to our current view of how the world 
functions. In the earliest days, accidents were explained by invoking 'acts of god' or 'acts of nature', and therefore as being beyond 
human control. As humans gradually became masters of technology, especially after the second industrial revolution around 1750, 
'acts of nature' were replaced by technological failures or shortcomings. The role of technology as the main source of problems, 
and paradoxically also of solutions, was generally accepted until 1979, when the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power 
plant demonstrated that safeguarding technology was not enough. Technological malfunctions were replaced by 'human error' 
as a convenient cause, although the latter was harder to improve or eliminate than the former. In 1986, only seven years later, 
the loss of the space shuttle Challenger, reinforced by the accident in Chernobyl, required explanations that went beyond 'human 
error'. This led to the introduction of concepts such as organisational failures and safety culture. While this sufficed for a while, 
there has lately been a trend to adopt yet another cause, namely 'complexity'. 
 
The causality credo not only represents the firm human belief that there must be a reason or explanation for everything, but also 
represents three biases that go along with the belief in causation. The first is the proportionality bias, which says when that 
something big happens then something big must have caused it. The second is the valence bias, which says that negative 
consequences have negative causes and vice versa. And finally, there is the intentionality bias, which says that when something 
ambiguous happens then it must have been intended. 
 
New types of accidents have, historically speaking, always led to new types of causes but without challenging the underlying 
assumption of linear causality. We have therefore become so used to explain accidents in terms of cause-effect relations that we 
no longer notice it. And we continue to do so although it has becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile with reality. 
2. Safety-I: Avoiding That Things Go Wrong 
The historical development of safety thinking in combination with the causality credo leads to the view of safety illustrated by 
Figure 1. According to this, unacceptable outcomes happen because of preceding failures and malfunctions (cf., the intentionality 
bias), while acceptable outcomes happen because everything - including people - worked as it should. This implies a 'hypothesis 
of different causes', namely that the causes or 'mechanisms' of adverse events are different from those of events that succeed. 
If that was not the case, then the elimination of the causes and the neutralisation of the 'mechanisms' would also reduce the 
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likelihood that things could go right, hence be counterproductive. 
This way of thinking corresponds to a definition of safety as a condition where the number of adverse outcomes (accidents / 
incidents / near misses) is as low as possible. Since this is also the traditional way of defining safety, it can be called Safety-I (The 
alternative proposed by resilience engineering is called Safety-II). Safety-I tacitly assumes that systems work because they are well 
designed and carefully maintained, because procedures are complete and correct, because even minor contingencies have been 
foreseen and anticipated, and because people behave as they are expected to. The purpose of safety management consequently 
becomes how to achieve and maintain that state. When people's performance is different from what has been predicted this 
unavoidably leads to an emphasis on compliance in the way work is carried out. 
 
The definition of Safety-I is however problematic in several ways. One is that safety is defined by its opposite, by what happens 
when it is missing. Another that safety is measured indirectly, not by its presence or as a quality in itself, but by the consequences 
of its absence. And finally that the study of safety focuses on accidents and incidents, which are situations where safety by 
definition is absent. 
3. Looking at what Goes Wrong Rather than Looking at what Goes Right 
Resilience engineering has since its inception argued that the Safety-I perspective is both oversimplified and misdirected. Resilience 
engineering rejects the hypothesis of different causes and instead argues that things happen in basically the same way regardless 
of whether they go right or go wrong (Hollnagel et al., 2011; Hollnagel, 2014). Resilience engineering also points out that things 
as a rule go right and only exceptionally go wrong. Indeed, when something goes wrong it is more than likely that it has been 
done many times before or has happened many times before and that it always has gone right. It therefore makes sense to try 
to understand how acceptable outcomes happen as a basis for trying to understand how unacceptable outcomes happen. The 
consequences of looking at what goes wrong rather than looking at what goes right are illustrated by Figure 2, which represents 
the case where the (statistical) probability of a failure is 1 out of 10,000. In other words, for every time we expect that something 
will go wrong (the red line), there are 9,999 times where we should expect that things will go right and lead to the outcome we 
want (the green area). 
 
Figure 1. The Safety-I view of failures and accidents 
188 Erik Hollnagel J Ergon Soc Korea 
Journal of the Ergonomics Society of Korea 
The focus on what goes wrong is required by regulators and authorities, supported by models and methods, documented in 
countless databases, and described in literally thousands of papers, books, and conference proceedings. The net result is a deluge 
of information both about how things go wrong and about what must be done to prevent this from happening. The recipe is the 
simple principle known as 'find and fix': look for failures and malfunctions, try to find their causes, and try to eliminate causes 
and/or improve barriers. 
 
The situation is quite different when it comes to that which goes right, i.e., the 9,999 events out of the 10,000. The focus on what 
goes right receives little encouragement; it is not required by authorities; there are few theories or models about how human and 
organisational performance succeeds, and few methods to help us study how it happens; actual data are difficult to locate; it is 
hard to find papers, books or other forms of scientific literature about it; and there are few people who even consider it worthwhile. 
In other words, we spend nearly all our time and resources to understand why things go wrong, but very little to understand 
why they go right. We stubbornly study the absence of safety, the one event of of 10.000 that goes wrong, but neglect to study 
the presence of safety, the 9.999 times out of 10.000 that go right! 
4. Why do things go Right? 
Resilience engineering proposes that things go well because people are able to adjust what they do to match the conditions 
of work. Furthermore that this happens on all levels of an organisation, from board meetings to floor sweeping. People learn to 
identify and compensate for design flaws and functional glitches, they learn to recognise the actual demands and adjust their 
performance accordingly, and they learn interpret and apply procedures to match the conditions. People also notice when 
something is about to go wrong, and try to intervene before the situation becomes grave. This can be described as performance 
variability, not in the negative sense of deviations from some norm or standard, but in the sense of the smooth adjustments that 
are necessary for safety and productivity. 
 
Performance adjustments are a sine qua non for the functioning of complex socio-technical systems. Attempts to prevent 
unacceptable outcomes or failures by eliminating or constraining performance adjustments, for instance by insisting on compliance, 
are counterproductive since they will affect the ability to produce the desired acceptable outcomes. Instead efforts should be 
made to facilitate the necessary performance adjustments by making it easier to perceive the resources and constraints of a 
situation and by making it easier to anticipate the consequences of actions. Performance adjustments should be managed by 
attenuation (dampening) if they seem to go in the wrong direction and by strengthening (amplification) if they seem to go in the 
Figure 2. The imbalance between things that go right and things that go wrong 
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right direction. In order to do so it is necessary first to acknowledge the inevitability and necessity of performance variability, 
second to find ways to monitor it, and third to find ways to control it. 
5. Safety-II: Ensuring That Things Go Right 
Our socio-technical environment continues to develop and become more complicated, not least due to the temptation of ever 
more powerful information technology. The thinking represented by Safety-I is therefore increasingly unable to deliver the required 
and coveted 'state of safety'. The common solution is to 'stretch' Safety-I tools and concepts even further until they 'break'. 
Another solution is to change the definition of safety from 'avoiding that something goes wrong' to 'ensuring that everything 
goes right' - or more precisely to the ability to succeed under varying conditions, so that the number of intended and acceptable 
outcomes (in other words, everyday activities) is as high as possible. This can be called Safety-II (Figure 3). The basis for safety and 
safety management now becomes an understanding why things go right, which means an understanding of everyday activities. 
 
Because everything basically happens in the same way regardless of the outcome, it is no longer necessary need to have one type 
of causes and ‘mechanisms’ for things that go wrong (accident and incidents) and another for things that go right (everyday 
work). The purpose of safety management is to ensure the latter, since by doing so it will also reduce the former. Safety-I and 
Safety-II therefore both lead to a reduction in unwanted outcomes, but use fundamentally different approaches with important 
consequences for how the process is managed and measured - as well as for productivity and quality. 
 
From a Safety-II perspective, the purpose of safety management is to ensure that as much as possible goes right and that 
everyday work achieves its intended purposes. This cannot be done by responding alone, since that will only correct what has 
happened. Safety management must also be proactive. For this to work, it is necessary to think about what can happen and to 
have the appropriate means (people and resources) to do something about it. That in turn requires an understanding of how the 
system works, of how its environment develops and changes, and of how functions may depend on and affect each other. This 
understanding can be developed by looking for patterns and relations across events rather than for causes of individual events. 
To see and find those patterns, it is necessary to take time to understand work-as-done rather than to spend all resources on 
fire-fighting. 
 
Figure 3. The Safety-II view of failures and successes 
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6. Conclusion 
Safety efforts under Safety-I are usually triggered by some kind of adverse event or unexpected outcome. The larger and the 
more severe the event is, the more urgent and extensive is the response. The primary aim is to prevent the adverse event from 
ever happening again, either by trying to identify and eliminate the causes (hazards) or by finding ways to contain the outcome 
or consequences of the accident. This typically involves comparing what actually happened (work-as-done) to what had been 
assumed or prescribed (work-as-imagined) and categorising the actual actions as one form of non-compliance or the other. 
 
Safety efforts under Safety-II lead to a different practice. First and foremost to look at 'work-as-done' - to pay attention to what 
happens when 'nothing' happens - and to recognise the habitual ways of working that are the basis for everyday productivity. 
Work well done is impossible with adjustments, large and small. The adjustments are the reason both for acceptable and 
unacceptable outcomes 
 
In Safety-I learning is based on accidents and learning efforts are proportional to the severity of the outcome. In Safety-II learning 
should be based on the frequency of events rather than the severity. It is simpler and less costly to make small changes to 
everyday performance than to make large changes to rare performance. The benefits are also easier to see and to calculate, 
and give a better return on investment. 
 
Overall, safety management can and should not be based on accidents and incidents, which represent snapshots of unacceptable 
performance. Safety management should instead care about what happens all the time, about the continuous flow of activities 
that constitute work-as-done. We nearly always know how many times something has failed or go wrong, but we rarely know 
how many times or how often something just works. 
 
Resilience engineering does not argue for a wholesale replacement of Safety-I by Safety-II, but rather proposes a combination 
of the two ways of thinking. Safety-II is first and foremost a different understanding of what safety is, hence also a different way 
of applying many of the familiar methods and techniques. In addition to that it will also require methods on its own, to look at 
things that go right, to analyse how things work, and to manage performance variability rather than just constraining it. We cannot 
make things go right simply by preventing them from going wrong. We can only make things go right by understanding the 
nature of everyday performance and by learning how to perceive those things which we otherwise do not see. 
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